Attachment ■ Curve Number and Runoff Calculations

Curve Number and Runoff Calculations Worksheet

1- Areas

Areas were measured from the INTEC Title Page Drawing. See Attached.

INTEC Total Area =	6,439,000 SF
TANK FARMAREA	C24 000 SE
TANK FARM AREA	634,000 SF

INTEC FACILITY (Not Including Tank Farm Area) (A2)

Total Area = 6,439,000 - 634,000

5,805,000 SF

Impermeable Areas	
Building Area	617,778 SF
Structure Area	125,808 SF
Sidewalk Area	45,315 SF
Paved Area	786,604 SF
Total Impermeable Area =	1,576,000 SF

Total Permeable Area = 5,805,000 SF - 1,576,000 SF =

4,229,000 SF

2- Curve Numbers (CN)

Calculated using method described in SCS Technical Release = 55 (SCS, 1986).

TANK FARM AREA = 98

INTECFACILTY (Not including Tank Farm A m)

Permeable Area CN = 77 Impermeable Area CN = 98

Composite CN = (77 x 4,229,000 + 98 x 1,576,000) / 5,805,000 =

827

3- Precipitation

The amount of precipitation used for sizing the evaporation pond is based on the 25-yr snowmelt event. This is shown in Figure 7 and is the second largest snowmelt event shown in Figure 5.

26 in

4- Runoff Volume

Calculated using method described in SCS Technical Release - 55 (SCS, 1986).

TANK FARMAREA

Potential Maximum retention after runoff begins

S = (1000/CN) - 10 =

0.20 inches

Runoff (inches)= $Q = (P-0.2S)^2/(P+0.8S) =$

2.57 in

Runoff Volume = QA =

136,000 Cu. Ft.

INTEC FACILTY (Not Including Tank Farm Area)

Potential Maximum retention after runoff begins

S = (1000/CN) - 10 =

2.09 inches

Runoff (inches) = $Q = (P-0.2S)^2/(P+0.8S) =$

1.27 in

Runoff Volume = QA =

614,000 Cu. Ft.

TOTAL RUNOFF VOLUME =

750,000 Cu. Ft.

Attachment 2 Rip-rap Sizing Calculations

SIZE RIP-RAP

DESIGN SHEAR STRESS: 7 = 7 ds

where: $T_{w} = 62.4 \text{ lb/t}^3$ d = 1.36 ftS = 0.002 ft/ft

Td= 62.40b (1.36 pt)(0.002 pt) = 0.17 lb 502

ALLOWABLE SHEAR STRESS, FROM CHART 3.

FOR I"DIA. RIP-RAP. 2 0.38 lb/ft2


To TALL : OK

SPECIFY 4" to 6" DIA RIP-RAP

2-39 SOUARE 2-30 SOURETS PE-E-50 SOUARE 2-30 SOURETS PE-E-50 SOUARE 2-39 SOO RECYCLED WHITE 5 SOUARE 2-39 SOO RECYCLED WHITE 5 SOUARE 2-39 SOO RECYCLED WHITE 5 SOUARE

National ®Brand

SPILLWAY CULVERT CAPACITY



P= 0.02+

$$A = 1 (2)^{3} = 3.14$$
, $R = 1 = 2 = 0.5 \text{ f}$

HEAD LOSS:

$$H_{L} = \left(\frac{1}{R^{4/3}} + 1 \right) \frac{v^2}{2g} = h$$

AND HEADWATER DEPTH

$$2.124 = \left(1.9 + \frac{29(0.024)^{2}(0.024)^{2}}{(0.5)^{4/3}}\right) \frac{v^{2}}{2g}$$

V= 5.51 fps

TOTAL DISCHARGE: 34.6 CSS

Pond Discharge Channel Worksheet for Trapezoidal Channel

Project Description	on
Project File	d:\job files\intec\tank farm interimaction\tf inter.fm2
Worksheet	Pond Discharge Channel
Flow Element	Trapezoidal Channel
Method	Manning's Formula
Solve For	Channel Depth

Input Data	
Mannings Coefficient	0.035
Channel Slope	0.002000 ft/ft
Left Side Slope	2.000000 H:V
Right Side Slope	2.000000 H:V
Bottom Width	10.00 ft
Discharge	34.60 cfs

Results		
Depth	1.36	ft
Flow Area	17.34	ft²
Wetted Perimeter	16.09	ft
Top Width	15.45	ft
Critical Depth	0.69	ft
Critical Slope	0.0217	40 ft/f t
Velocity	2.00	ft/s
Velocity Head	0.06	ft
Specific Energy	1.42	ft
Froude Number	0.33	
Flow is subcritical.		




Chart 3: Permissible Shear Stress for Non-cohesive Soils (From HEC-15)



INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

Date:

October 27, 1999

To:

R. Lee Davison MS 3953

526-3770

From:

Peggy J. Jessmore

MS 3953

526-9367

Subject:

SAFETY ANALYSIS AND UNRESOLVED SAFETY QUESTION -

OPERABLE UNIT (OU) 3-13 TANK FARM INTERIM ACTION, PHASE 1

- PJJ-01-99

Attached are the approvals for the Request for Determination of Safety Analysis Requirements, and the Unresolved Safety Question Safety Evaluation Screening for Facility Modifications for Phase 1 of the OU 3-13 Interim Action. Please place these in the OU 3-13 project files. If the scope of Phase 1 is modified to include changes to the tank farm structures or soil shielding above the tanks within the INTEC tank farm fence, these documents will need to be re-evaluated.

PJJ

Attachment

cc:

Robert E. James, MS 3953 ARDC File, MS 3922 Peggy J. Jessmore Letter File

Attachment R. Lee Davison PJJ-01-99 **Page 1 of** 5



431.12 08/24/98 Rev. 01

REQUEST FOR DETERMINATION OF SAFETY ANALYSIS REQUIREMENTS

		Date: 10/13/99
A. To B	e Completed by Project Manager, Project Management Department	nt
1.	Project OU 3-13 Phase I Tank Farm InterimAction	
	Project Manager Randy L Davison	Mail Stop <u>3953</u>
	Type:	Other
2.	Reference Documents Submitted:	
	Check the documents submitted with this request: Technical Functional Requirements Design Criteria Conceptual Design Report Environmental Evaluation or EIS USQ Screening Other	
3. To B	e Completed by the Cognizant Safety Analysis Organization	
Task	Number	
1.	New Facility Project:	
2.	PSAR required before facility construction? New SAR or revision/addendum to an existing SAR required before operation? Will this be a nuclear facility (see MCP-2446)?] Yes ⊠ No] Yes □ No] Yes ⊠ No
	USQ evaluation required?] Yes ⊠ No
	Revision/addendum to an existing SAR required?	Yes 🛭 No
	Descriptive changes to an existing SAR required?	- —] Yes ⊠ No
	Hazard category/classification Tank Farm area is Hazard Cat 2 fa	-
3.	Justification for Items B.1 - B.2: This project will not change or modify the tank farm structures or soil susage on or around the tank farm area must be in compliance with the analysis or safety document revisions are not required for this project.	e requirements of TS 4.2B14 for load controls. Saf
4.	Proposed schedule for Company and DOE approvals of required Safe Not applicable	ety Analvsis:
Request fo	r Safety Analysis Approval E. E. Hochhalter	1 8 st 10/25/99
Ma	E. E. Hochhalter nager, Safety Analysis Unit/Department Print/Type Name Signa	Ness Unit Department Date

The OU 3-13 Interim Action Phase I scope of work includes upgrading existing surface and building drainages, installing new drainage ditches, and constructing new storm water collection pondsd at INTEC. The objective in performing this work is to direct/control precipitation run-on away from the tank farm area, as mandated in the Record of Decision. Upgrading existing surface drainages consists of removing the exising rock currently lining the ditches, adding sub base and concrete linings. Upgrading existing building drainages consists of upgrading, adding or redirecting existing rain gutters away from the tank farm area. Excavation, and addition of sub base and concrete lining will be required for the new drainage ditches. New culverts and a new fence will also be installed at various project locations. All drainage ditches will be routed to the new storm water collection ponds, constructed outside the INTEC facility fence. Construction of these ponds requires excavation, dirt moving, and compaction, using heavy equipment. This field work is scheduled to begin in August 2000 and end in January 2001.

431.19B 06/12/98 Rev. 00

USQ SAFETY EVALUATION SCREENING FOR FACILITY MODIFICATIONS

USQ Determination No.: 99-USQ - 4.2 - 0075 Revision No.: Title of Proposed Modification: OU 3-13 Phase I Tank Farm Interim Action Describe the Proposed Modification and its potential effects: The OU 3-13 Interim Action Phase I scope of work includes upgrading existing surface and building doinstalling new drainage ditches, and constructing new storm water collection pondsd at INTEC. The construction performing this work is to direct/control precipitation run-off away from the tank farm area, as mandate Record of Decision. Upgrading existing surface drainages consists of removing the existing rock current the ditches, adding sub base and concrete linings. Upgrading existing building drainages consists of redirecting existing rain gutters away from the tank farm area. Excavation and addition of sub base are lining will be required for the new drainage ditches. New culverts and a new fence will also be installed various project locations. All drainage ditches will be routed to the new storm water collection ponds, outside the INTEC facility fence. Construction of these ponds requires excavation, dirt moving, and construction of these ponds requires excavation. This field work is scheduled to begin in August 2000 and end in January 2000.	luc	ear Facility or Activity:	Tank Farm				
Title of Proposed Modification: OU 3-13 Phase I Tank Farm Interim Action Describe the Proposed Modification and its potential effects: The OU 3-13 Interim Action Phase I scope of work includes upgrading existing surface and building dinstalling new drainage ditches, and constructing new storm water collection pondsd at INTEC. The operforming this work is to direct/control precipitation run-off away from the tank farm area, as mandate Record of Decision. Upgrading existing surface drainages consists of removing the existing rock curn the ditches, adding sub base and concrete linings. Upgrading existing building drainages consists of redirecting existing rain gutters away from the tank farm area. Excavation and addition of sub base an lining will be required for the new drainage ditches. New culverts and a new fence will also be install various project locations. All drainage ditches will be routed to the new storm water collection ponds, outside the INTEC facility fence. Construction of these ponds requires excavation, ditmoving, and ou using heavy equipment. This field work is scheduled to begin in August 2000 and end in January 200 List the reference location(s) of safety requirement(s) in the authorization basis or any Technical Safety Requirement (SC) or part of a larger SSC described in the authorization basis? Consider the following specific possibilities as a minimum. 1. Could the change adversely affect the safety function of a structure, system, or component (SSC) or part of a larger SSC described in the authorization basis? Consider the following specific possibilities as a minimum. 1. Could the operability or effectiveness of instrumentation important to safety be degraded? 2. Could the change adversely affect the ability or a shielding structure to mitigate the consequences of a criticality accident of other major radiation incident? 3. Could the change adversely affect the integrity of a fuel storage rack or storage fixture? 4. Could the change adversely affect the integrity of a fuel storag		,		Revision No:			
Describe the Proposed Modification and its potential effects: The OU 3-13 Interim Action Phase I scope of work includes upgrading existing surface and building dinstalling new drainage ditches, and constructing new storm water collection pondsd at INTEC. The cere performing this work is to direct/control precipitation run-off away from the tank farm area, as mandate Record of Decision. Upgrading existing surface drainages consists for emoving the existing rock curn the ditches, adding sub base and concrete linings. Upgrading existing building drainages consists of redirecting existing rain gutters away from the tank farm area. Excavation and addition of sub base an lining will be required for the new drainage ditches. New culverts and a new fence will also be install various project locations. All drainage ditches will be routed to the new storm water collection ponds, outside the INTEC facility fence. Construction of these ponds requires excavation, dirt moving, and or using heavy equipment. This field work is scheduled to begin in August 2000 and end in January 200 List the referencelocation(s) of safety requirement(s) in the authorization basis or any Technical Safety Requirement(s) related to the Proposed Modification: PSD 4.2, "Aqueous Liquid Waste Management" Associated 4.2 series of TS/Ss **ISQ** Screening: Juld the change adversely affect the safety function of a structure, system, or component (SSC) or part of a larger SSC described in the authorization basis? Consider the following specific possibilities as a minimum. 1. Could the change adversely affect the ability or a shielding structure to mitigate the consequences of a criticality accident of other major radiation incident? 2. Could the change adversely affect the ability or a shielding structure to mitigate the consequences of a criticality accident of other major radiation incident? 4. Could the change adversely affect the integrity of a fuel storage rack or storage fixture? 5. Could the change result in a criticality scenario differen							
The OU 3-13 Interim Action Phase I scope of work includes upgrading existing surface and building dinstalling new drainage ditches, and constructing new storm water collection ponds at INTEC. The certoring this work is to dired/control precipitation run-off away from the tank farm area, as mandate Record of Decision. Upgrading existing surface drainages consists of removing the existing rock curr the ditches, adding sub base and concrete linings. Upgrading existing building drainages consists of redirecting existing rain gutters away from the tank farm area. Excavation and addition of sub base are lining will be required for the new drainage ditches. New culverts and a new fence will also be installed various project locations. All drainage ditches will be routed to the new storm water collection ponds, outside the INTEC facility fence. Construction of these ponds requires excavation, dirt moving, and counting heavy equipment. This field work is scheduled to begin in August 2000 and end in January 200 List the reference location(s) of safety requirement(s) in the authorization basis or any Technical Safety Requirement (some proposed Modification: PSD 4.2, "Aqueous Liquid Waste Management" Associated 4.2 series of TS/Ss *ISQ Screening: Juld the change adversely affect the safety function of a structure, system, or component (SSC) or part of a larger SSC described in the authorization basis? Consider the following specific possibilities as a minimum. 1. Could the operability or effectiveness of instrumentationimportant to safety be degraded? 2. Could the change adversely affect the ability or a shielding structure to mitigate the consequences of a criticality accident of other major radiation incident? 3. Could the change adversely affect the integrity of a fuel storage rack or storage fixture? 4. Could the change adversely affect the integrity of a fuel storage rack or storage fixture? 5. Could the change result in a criticality scenario different from those considered in the authorization basis (for e	IUC	oi Froposed Modificati	ion. Ot 3-13 Fhase Hank Familinenin	Action			
Associated 4.2 series of TS/Ss **ISQ Screening: Juld the change adversely affect the safety function of a structure, system, or component (SSC) or part of a larger SSC described in the authorization basis? Consider the following specific possibilities as a minimum. 1. Could the operability or effectiveness of instrumentationimportant to safety be degraded? 2. Could the change adversely affect the ability or a shielding structure to mitigate the consequences of a criticality accident of other major radiation incident? 3. Could the change adversely affect an HVAC exhaust air filtration system in controlling airborne radioactivity releases to the environment or in mitigatingthe consequences of an accident? 4. Could the change adversely affect the integrity of a fuel storage rack or storage fixture? 5. Could the change result in a criticality scenario different from those considered in the authorization basis (for example, different assembly mechanism, composition or configuration of a postulated critical array)? 6. Could a plant protection system be adversely affected? 7. Could the change adversely affect a safety class or safety significant design feature, an	The OU 3-13 Interim Action Phase I scope of work includes upgrading existing surface and building drainages, installing new drainage ditches, and constructing new storm water collection pondsd at INTEC. The objective in performing this work is to direct/control precipitation run-off away from the tank farm area, as mandated in the Record of Decision. Upgrading existing surface drainages consists of removing the existing rock currently lining the ditches, adding sub base and concrete linings. Upgrading existing building drainages consists of adding or redirecting existing rain gutters away from the tank farm area. Excavation and addition of sub base and concrete lining will be required for the new drainage ditches. New culverts and a new fence will also be installed at various project locations. All drainage ditches will be routed to the new storm water collection ponds, constructed outside the INTEC facility fence. Construction of these ponds requires excavation, dirt moving, and compaction, using heavy equipment. This field work is scheduled to begin in August 2000 and end in January 2001. List the referencelocation(s) of safety requirement(s) in the authorization basis or any Technical Safety Requirement						
(SSC) or part of a larger SSC described in the authorization basis? Consider the following specific possibilities as a minimum. 1. Could the operability or effectiveness of instrumentation important to safety be degraded? 2. Could the change adversely affect the ability or a shielding structure to mitigate the consequences of a criticality accident of other major radiation incident? 3. Could the change adversely affect an HVAC exhaust air filtration system in controlling airborne radioactivity releases to the environment or in mitigating the consequences of an accident? 4. Could the change adversely affect the integrity of a fuel storage rack or storage fixture? 5. Could the change result in a criticality scenario different from those considered in the authorization basis (for example, different assembly mechanism, composition or configuration of a postulated critical array)? 6. Could a plant protection system be adversely affected? 7. Could the change adversely affect a safety class or safety significant design feature, an	SC		es of TS/Ss				
 Could the change adversely affect the ability or a shielding structure to mitigate the consequences of a criticality accident of other major radiation incident? Could the change adversely affect an HVAC exhaust air filtration system in controlling airborne radioactivity releases to the environment or in mitigating the consequences of an accident? Could the change adversely affect the integrity of a fuel storage rack or storage fixture? Could the change result in a criticality scenario different from those considered in the authorization basis (for example, different assembly mechanism, composition or configuration of a postulated critical array)? Could a plant protection system be adversely affected? Could the change adversely affect a safety class or safety significant design feature, an 	SS	c) or part of a larger SS	SC described in the authorization basis? C	system, or component Consider the following	YES	NO	
consequences of a criticality accident of other major radiation incident? 3. Could the change adversely affect an HVAC exhaust air filtration system in controlling airborne radioactivity releases to the environment or in mitigating the consequences of an accident? 4. Could the change adversely affect the integrity of a fuel storage rack or storage fixture? 5. Could the change result in a criticality scenario different from those considered in the authorization basis (for example, different assembly mechanism, composition or configuration of a postulated critical array)? 6. Could a plant protection system be adversely affected? 7. Could the change adversely affect a safety class or safety significant design feature, an	. (Could the operability or	effectiveness of instrumentation importan	nt to safety be degraded?		\boxtimes	
airborne radioactivity releases to the environment or in mitigating the consequences of an accident? 4. Could the change adversely affect the integrity of a fuel storage rack or storage fixture? 5. Could the change result in a criticality scenario different from those considered in the authorization basis (for example, different assembly mechanism, composition or configuration of a postulated critical array)? 6. Could a plant protection system be adversely affected? 7. Could the change adversely affect a safety class or safety significant design feature, an						\boxtimes	
 5. Could the change result in a criticality scenario different from those considered in the authorization basis (for example, different assembly mechanism, composition or configuration of a postulated critical array)? 6. Could a plant protection system be adversely affected? 7. Could the change adversely affect a safety class or safety significant design feature, an 	;	airborne radioactivity re				\boxtimes	
authorization basis (for example, different assembly mechanism, composition or configuration of a postulated critical array)? 6. Could a plant protection system be adversely affected? 7. Could the change adversely affect a safety class or safety significant design feature, an	. (Could the change adve	rsely affect the integrity of a fuel storage r	ack or storage fixture?		\boxtimes	
7. Could the change adversely affect a safety class or safety significant design feature, an	;	authorization basis (for	example, different assembly mechanism,			\boxtimes	
	. '	Could a plant protection	n system be adversely affected?			\boxtimes	
						\boxtimes	

'he answer to any of questions 1 through 8 above is 'Yes", a USQ safety evaluation must be performed ...1d documented on Form 431.20, **USQ** Safety Evaluation, or equivalent (see MCP-123).

 \boxtimes

Provide an explanation of the screening results below:

8. Could construction-related activities adversely affect a safety function?

431.198 06/12/98 Rev. 00

USQ SAFETY EVALUATION SCREENING FOR FACILITY MODIFICATIONS

This project is upgrading the existing surface and building drainages, installing new drainage ditches, and constructing new storm water collections ponds at INTEC. All work around the tank farm area using heavy equipment must be performed within the load restrictions identified in TS4.2B14.

E. E. Hochhalter

USQ Screener
(Type Name)

E. E. Hochhalter

USQ Screener
(Signature)

USQ Screener
(Signature)

Tile 7354

431.12 08/24/98 Rev. 01

REQUEST FOR DETERMINATION OF SAFETY ANALYSIS REQUIREMENTS

		Date: <u>01/26/00</u>				
A.	То В	e Completed by Project Manager, Project Management Department				
	1.	Project OU 3-13 Phase 2 Tank Farm InterimAction				
		Project Manager R. Lee Davison Mail Stop 3953				
		Type: Line Item GPP CE WorkOrder Other				
	2.	Reference Documents Submitted:				
		Check the documents submitted with this request: Technical Functional Requirements				
В.	To Bo	e Completed by the Cognizant Safety Analysis Organization				
Ь.						
		Number				
	1.	New Facility Proiect:				
		PSAR required before facility construction? New SAR or revision/addendum to an existing SAR required before operation? Yes No Yes No				
		Will this be a nuclear facility (see MCP-2446)? ☐ Yes K No				
	2.	Existina Facility Modifications:				
		USQ evaluation required? ☐ Yes 🔀 No				
		Revision/addendum to an existing SAR required? ☐ Yes ☑ No				
		Descriptive changes to an existing SAR required? Hazard category/classification N/A				
	Justification for Items B.1-B.2: This project is penforming a surface grading of the Tank Fam to create positive drainage. Soft on by sis for this work is not creating, provided the load Limits as and soil which the thesses are required, provided the load Limits as and soil which the thesses are required, provided the load Limits as and soil which the thesses are required, provided the load Limits as and soil which the thesses are required schedule for Company and DOE approvals of required Safety Analysis:					
	4. Proposed schedule for Company and DOE approvals of required Safety Analysis:					
	N/A					
Request for Satisty Analysis Approval						
	E	F. E. Hochhalter & E. Hochhelle 2/8/00				
		Color Archive II W Doods and				

Signature

Print/Type Name

The OU 3-13 Tark Farm Interim Action Phase 2 scope of work consists of the following:

- Surficial grading of the tark farm area (TFA) to create positive drainage. It is anticipated that current load restrictions will not be affected by the redistribution of soils during the grading process. This will be accomplished by redistributing equal volumes of cut and fill within the same zone, which is permissible and does not affect load limitations.
- Installation of two swales/ditches within the tack farm to direct water out of the TFA.
- Surface sealing the entire TFA with a poly urea spray on coating.

Penetration below the **current** liner is anticipated, but will be avoided where possible. A **grading** plan is currently in **progress.** It is anticipated that soil within the tank farm will remain in the tank farm, however, this may change depending on the results of the grading plan.

File 7354.

431.12 08/24/98 Rev. 01

REQUEST FOR DETERMINATION OF SAFETY ANALYSIS REQUIREMENTS

	Date: <u>2-24-00</u>
То В	Be Completed by Project Manager, Project Management Department
1.	Project INTEC Polyurea Demonstration
	Project Manager Michelle Kaptein Mail Stop 3953
	Type: ■ LineItem GPP CE WorkOrder Other Product demo.
2.	Reference Documents Submitted:
	Check the documents submitted with this request: Technical Functional Requirements Feasibility Studies Design Criteria Project Plan Conceptual Design Report WorkOrder Environmental Evaluation or EIS Engineering Change Form USQ Screening Other Demonstration Plan
То В	Se Completed by the Cognizant Safety Analysis Organization
Task	Number
1.	New Facility Project:
	PSAR required before facility construction? New SAR or revision/addendum to an existing SAR required before operation? Will this be a nuclear facility (see MCP-2446)? □ Yes □ No No
2.	Existing Facility Modifications:
	USQ evaluation required? Revision/addendum to an existing SAR required? Descriptive changes to an existing SAR required? Hazard category/classification Yes No Yes No
3.	Justification for Items B.1-B.2: This is a demonstration project for application of a spray-on Doly Urea product. This demonstration does not require soft molysis
4.	Proposed schedule for Company and DOE approvals of required Safety Analysis:
	N/A
equest 1	for Safety Analysis Approval
Ę	E Hochhafter Safety Analysis Unit/Department Manager, Safety Analysis Unit/Department Date
IV	Manager, Safety Analysis Unit/Department Manager, Safety Analysis Unit/Department / Date Print/Type Name Signature

De	escribe the Proposed Test/Experiment and its potential effects: A test area at INTEC will be sprayed with poly urea, which is a spray on applied impermedemonstration is required to determine product performance and bonding capabilities to vertically applicable and bonding capabilities.					
	st the reference location(s) of safety requirement(s) in the authorization basis document(s) (i.e., SRs) related to the Proposed Test/Experiment: INTEC Facility Specific SARs and Plant Safety Document Sections.	SAR, BIO, T	SRs,			
US	SQ Screening:	YES	NO			
1.	Could this test or experiment introduce conditions or materials other than those described in the authorization basis for the facility/activity?		\boxtimes			
2.	Could the conduct of this test or experiment adversely affect approved margins of safety described in the authorization basis, either during normal operations or during anticipated or unlikely transients (abnormal conditions)?		\boxtimes			
3.	Could the conduct of this test or experiment adversely affect the adequacy of structures, systems, or components (SSCs) intended to prevent or mitigate accidents?		\boxtimes			
4.	Is this a post-modificationtest or experiment which was not considered in the USQ screening or safety evaluation for the modification?		\boxtimes			
	If the answer to any of questions 1, 2, 3, or 4 above is Yes", a USQ safety evaluation must be performed and documented on Form 431.20, USQ Safety Evaluation, or equivalent (see MCP-123).					
Provide an explanation of the screening results below: This is a demonstration project that is testing a spray on product on the ground surface between TB-6 and the tank farm. This demonstration project does not impact the Tank Farm authorization basis, which is a nuclear facility.						
	E. E. Hochhalter E. E. Hochhalta	3/20/0	o			
	USQ Screener (Typed Name) USQ Screener (Signature)	Dat	e			

Ĩ